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SECRETARY, MACMILLAN AND LLOYD, ACCOMPANIED BY SMALL NUMBER ADVISERS, DISCUSSED BERLIN AND GERMANY THIS EVENING. ON SHORT-TERM ASPECTS THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON MANY DETAILS. MACMILLAN, HOWEVER, SEEMED MORE PREOCCUPIED WITH WHAT HE CALLED LONG-TERM POSSIBILITIES IN EUROPE. ON THIS LLOYD NOTED THAT HIS THINKING WAS FAR AHEAD OF THAT OF FOREIGN OFFICE. RE SHORT-TERM, SECRETARY REPEATED VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED EARLIER IN DAY TO LLOYD (SECTO 4) ON DRAWING ISSUE WITH SOVIETS AT ATTEMPTED SUBSTITUTION GDR FOR SOVIET CONTROL OVER ALLIED ACCESS TO BERLIN, AND SUCCESSIVE MILITARY AND POLITICAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN IF GDR ATTEMPTS PHYSICAL OBSTRUCTION OF ACCESS. BRITISH DID NOT DISAGREE. THERE WAS CASUAL REFERENCE TO POSSIBILITY "AGENT THEORY" MIGHT ONE DAY BE ACCEPTED IF SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED IT. SECRETARY EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THE SOVIETS DO NOT WANT TO GO TO WAR OVER BERLIN ISSUE BUT WE MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO PUT THEM INTO A POSITION WHERE THEY FEEL THEY HAVE TO.

CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF CONFERENCE WITH SOVIETS REFLECTED AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONE, THAT IT SHOULD BE IN SESSION ON MAY 27 AND THEREFORE SHOULD PROBABLY NOT START UNTIL EARLY MAY, AND THAT IT SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY CONFERENCE OF WESTERN FOUR AT FOREIGN MINISTER OR EVEN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL AT LEAST AS TO UK, FRANCE AND GERMANY. MACMILLAN FELT THIS LATTER CONFERENCE IN TURN SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY HIS VISITING WASHINGTON TO MEET PRESIDENT AFTER HIS VISITS TO MOSCOW, BONN AND PARIS; MIDDLE MARCH WAS A SUGGESTION. AGREED APRIL NATO MEETING FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONCERTING POSITION.

ON SUBSTANCE, MACMILLAN FELT THAT, ALTHOUGH SWEEPING NEW PROPOSALS

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-2- DULTE 3, FEBRUARY 5, 2 AM, FROM LONDON

PROPOSALS MIGHT NOT BE READY BEFORE CONFERENCES ENVISAGED, WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE LONG-TERM CONTEXT FOR OUR OWN THINKING. HIS PREMISES WERE THAT WEST GERMANS ARE NOT SO KEEN ON REUNIFICATION AS OUR PRESENT POLICY SUBSUMES; THAT EVEN IF PRESENT POLICY LASTS AS LONG AS ADENAUER, HIS SUCCESSORS MAY BE TEMPTED TO SEEK A DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS WHICH WILL DESTROY THE BASIS OF OUR ENTIRE EUROPEAN POLICY; AND THAT WE SHOULD THEREFORE TRY TO ASSURE THAT WE GET AT LEAST NOW, AND HOPEFULLY IN THE LONG FUTURE, OUR "MONEY'S WORTH". ALTHOUGH, IN THE MACMILLAN THESIS, THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE MAY SUIT US AND THE WEST GERMANS AND THE SOVIETS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER AN INSPECTED "THINNING OUT" OF FORCES IN EUROPE MIGHT NOT BE AN ADVANTAGEOUS PROPOSAL, AS LONG AS IT INVOLVED NO DISCRIMINATION NATIONALITY OR FORCE WISE. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE AREA IN EUROPE ENCOMPASSED IN SUCH A SCHEME WAS LARGE ENOUGH IT MIGHT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE SORT OF REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY WITH WHICH WE COULD LIVE, ESPECIALLY IF IT WOULD GET THE RED ARMY BACK INTO THE SOVIET UNION. MACMILLAN ARGUED FURTHER THAT HIS IDEA WOULD, IF IT WORKED, BE A MAJOR GAIN IN DETACHING THE COMMUNIST CLAWS FROM A SIGNIFICANT AREA, A DETACHMENT WHICH IN HIS VIEW WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REVERBERANCE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF MOSCOW.

SECRETARY EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS INVOLVED IN THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. HE AND MERCHANT WEIGHED THE RISKS OF ATTEMPTING A "THINNING OUT" BASED ON THE STATUS QUO AND OF ACQUIESCING IN THE LONG-TERM DIVISION OF GERMANY. THERE WAS NO AGREED CONCLUSION ON THESE "LONG-TERM" MATTERS.

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